The Geopolitics of the ‘Kurdish Opening’

by Mehmet Ali Guller, published on The Cradle, August 24, 2026

The “Kurdish Opening” being pursued by Turkiye is not independent of the events taking place in West Asia. In fact, this latest opening, launched for the fourth time by the same government, aims to take advantage of the window of opportunity created by the developments in our region.

Therefore, we must first examine the regional factors affecting Turkiye’s Kurdish Opening.

The US Kurdish card failed in Iran

The war waged by imperialist US against Iran, and the fact that this war has currently reached an impasse in the Strait of Hormuz, are giving rise to a new security architecture and new types of relations in our region.

For one thing, the realization that the US security umbrella does not work, and that Iranian missiles are capable of striking US bases, has pushed the countries hosting those bases to seek new security arrangements. One of the latest examples of this is the Mecca Joint Defense Agreement signed by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkiye.

On the other hand, Iran’s effective defense against the US has also affected relations between the US and its allies in the region. Iranian missiles ensured that US allies remained outside the war. This applies both to states and to sub-state actors. For example, the US was unable to mobilize either the Kurds in Iran or the larger Kurdish groups in Iraq. Despite pressure from the US and Israel, these organizations remained on the sidelines because of Iran’s resistance.

In short, the Kurdish card, one of the US’s most important cards in the region, did not work against Iran.

This represents a serious rupture. In response to the support the USSR provided to Baathist regimes during the Cold War, the US also began investing in Kurdish groups, and over the past 60 years these relations have acquired considerable depth. The US had been able to mobilize Kurdish groups in the region both during its attack on Iraq and during its attack on Syria. But this time, the card did not work in Iran.

The US’s compulsory new strategy

The long-term struggle waged by imperialist US against the countries it declared to be the “axis of evil” and “rogue states” became stuck at Hormuz in Iran after Iraq, Libya, and Syria. In addition to Iran being a more difficult opponent, the fact that the US is experiencing a loss of power, together with the associated construction of a multipolar world, also played a role.

For this reason, the US announced a new security and defense doctrine. In essence, this doctrine is based on implementing a “new Monroe Doctrine” in the Western Hemisphere and focusing on its principal rival, China, in the other hemisphere. As a requirement of this, it also envisages the US sharing the burden with its allies in Europe and West Asia. This is why both the debate over “NATO 3.0” and the search for new security arrangements in West Asia are taking place.

The search for an Israel-centered order

However, for the US, there is in any case a goal of guaranteeing Israel’s security in the West Asia and, if possible, creating an Israel-centered security architecture. We could also call this an effort to establish a “new West Asian order under Israeli hegemony.”

This requires three things:

1. weakening Iran militarily and economically, breaking Iranian influence in the geography of the Axis of Resistance (Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Yemen), and surrounding Iran with US allies and confining it to its own geography. The Assad government was overthrown in Syria; an attempt is being made to disarm Hezbollah in Lebanon; Hamas’s power has been weakened in Gaza; Iran-backed groups in Iraq are under pressure; and efforts are being made to establish a multinational coalition against the Houthis in Yemen.
2. Normalization between Saudi Arabia, the Gulf countries, and Israel. Needless to say, progress in Gaza is also necessary for this to happen.
3. Achieving normalization between Israel and Turkiye and, in the words of US Ambassador Tom Barrack, “Turkey and Israel cooperating from the Caspian to the Mediterranean.”

The ground created by the situation of the Kurds

This situation creates pressure on some sub-state actors, but opportunities for others.

Syria: Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) – an offshoot of the Nusra Front – came to power in Damascus after ceasing to be classified as a terrorist organization. The People’s Protection Units (YPG)/Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), in which the US has made a major political and military investment, is being forced to integrate into the Syrian state.

Iraq: The independence initiative of the Kurdish groups in northern Iraq had already been stopped by the US because the prevailing circumstances did not permit it.

Iran: In this process, Tehran’s government used force to prevent the Kurds from becoming involved in the war alongside the US and Israel.

Turkiye: Under these circumstances, Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leader Ocalan developed a new strategy – to gain the right to exist within the political sphere in exchange for abandoning the pursuit of independence and even autonomy.

This is the basis on which the Justice and Development Party (AKP) has embarked on a Kurdish opening for the fourth time during its 23 years in power.

Common ground in the actors’ messages

The AKP, PKK, and US have found an opportunity to build a compatible foundation on this basis: the idea of replacing nation-states with models characterized by loose center-local relations, democracies with monarchies, and nations with the “ummah” constitutes a common point among all three.

We can find the political manifestations of this in the following messages from the actors:

Kurdish actors

The language used by Kurdish actors is revealing. Pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM) Co-Chair Tuncer Bakirhan told parliament that Turkish politics had long been trapped in the psychology of the “Mecca period,” defined by siege and confrontation. Turkiye, he argued, now needed the spirit of the “Medina period,” in which political and social unity could be built around shared interests and justice.

Mahmut Berhudan, an SDF official in Kobani, went further. He said the YPG/SDF would announce its dissolution, that the autonomous administration would disappear, and that Kurdish life in Syria could continue within the framework of the Islamic ummah.

“They divided us along the 1926 Brussels Line as though cutting us apart with a knife,” he said. “Now it is time to close this parenthesis and make peace.”

Ahmet Turk of DEM’s Imrali delegation made the regional direction even more explicit:

“I went to Iraq, I went to Syria. All Kurds have their eyes on Turkiye. They still see themselves as a part of Turkiye since the Ottoman era. Kurds can only live a just life and be free with Turks. They have no other choice.”

DEM Party Co-Chair Tuncer Bakirhan:

“Turkish politics has been experiencing a ‘Mecca period’ mentality for a long time. What Turkiye needs, however, is the wisdom of the ‘Medina period,’ in which political and social unity and justice are secured on the basis of common interests.”

(Turkish Grand National Assembly speech, 10 August 2026)

Mahmut Berhudan, the YPG/SDG official responsible for Syria/Kobani:

“We will announce the dissolution of the YPG/SDG. The autonomous administration structure will also disappear … The framework of the Islamic ummah does not disturb any Kurd. We can maintain our presence both within Syria and in other geographies only in this way … They separated us along the 1926 Brussels line as if cutting us apart with a knife. Now is the time to close this parenthesis and make peace.”

(Türkiye newspaper, 16 August 2026)

Ahmet Turk, a member of DEM’s Imrali delegation:

“I have been to Iraq, and I have been to Syria as well. All Kurds have their eyes on Turkiye. They still see themselves as part of Turkiye, going back to the Ottoman period. Kurds can live a just life and become free only with the Turks. They have no other choice.”

(Nefes newspaper, 4 January 2025)

Ankara

The statements voiced by the AKP government in recent years – such as “Turkiye is greater than Turkiye,” “If World War I had ended differently, Aleppo and Damascus would have been ours,” “our geographical sphere of affection,” and “we will be the protector of whoever asks” – complement Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s repeated emphasis on a “Turkish, Kurdish, Arab alliance” in this latest opening.

Moreover, from the very beginning of its rule, the AKP government had put forward the goal of a “greater Turkiye” from a neo-Ottomanist perspective. Erdogan’s statement that “a transition to a provincial system could be possible”, Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul’s statement during the previous opening that “Northern Iraq is our hinterland”, and Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s advocacy, during another opening, of “integration with Northern Iraq” are all requirements of the same objective.

We must also add the compatible objectives of the government’s nationalist partner, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). The fact that MHP Chairman Devlet Bahceli, who initiated this latest opening, assigned the license-plate numbers 82 to Mosul, 83 to Kirkuk, and 84 to Aleppo, carries the objective of expanding Turkiye through the Kurds on the basis of the National Pact “Misak-ı Milli,” a 1920 declaration outlining the territorial aspirations of the Turkish national movement.

The US

In this process, the statements of US Ambassador to Ankara and Special Representative for Iraq and Syria Tom Barrack are noteworthy. His remarks target the concept of the nation-state, open the door to monarchy, and, most importantly, support the AKP’s opening by saying that it will “bring together the Kurds in four countries.”

The risk of making Turkiye smaller by making it bigger

Whether this is a geopolitical possibility or merely a motivation employed by the partners of the opening to persuade their constituencies to support the process is, of course, debatable.

What matters here is that the objectives of the parties have found common ground under the current circumstances.

PKK leader Ocalan seeks to gain from a strategic process that could extend from the subordinate objective of a “democratic republic” to the higher objective of “democratic confederalism.”

The leaders of the AKP and MHP, meanwhile, believe that under conditions in which the US is experiencing an erosion of power and Iran’s influence in Iraq and Syria has been weakened, there is an opportunity for Turkiye to exercise political leadership in the region. If this convergence succeeds in achieving the government’s stated goal of a “Terror-Free Turkiye,” it will of course represent a very significant political and economic gain for Ankara. The AKP also sees this as a means of maintaining itself in power.

In short, the actors behind the opening want to implement a new model based on the Islamic ummah rather than the nation; living together as in the Ottoman period; the removal of the Turkiye-Iraq border, which was definitively established along the Brussels line accepted by the 1926 Treaty of Ankara; and a form of confederalism resembling that of Medina.

Undoubtedly, this initiative, which is based on a convergence of interests dictated by the current circumstances, could also veer in a completely different direction if those interests come into conflict.

Moreover, the objective of “expanding Turkiye through the Kurds” could also result in “making Turkiye smaller by making it bigger.”

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Mehmet Ali Guller is a graduate in Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering from Istanbul Technical University and also holds a degree in History from Istanbul University. He writes on foreign policy for Cumhuriyet and appears regularly on Tele1 TV. He has authored or contributed to 11 books on geopolitics, terrorism, and US imperialism.